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THREE-TIERED COMPLIANCE STRATEGY 
CARLA L. REYES∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Because of the different regulatory approaches of the United 
States and the European Union, litigants involved in U.S.-EU trans-
border litigation face a difficult situation regarding discovery. U.S. 
discovery procedures require litigants to produce any requested 
information under their control without regard to whether the 
information originated within U.S. borders.1 Meanwhile, the 
European Union prohibits the transfer of data originating within its 
borders to the United States because it has determined that the 
United States lacks adequate data protection standards.2 The steady 
increase of trans-border litigation has brought the conflict between 
U.S. discovery rules and EU data protection laws into sharp focus and 
spurred intense debate. 
Despite calls from EU member states’ data protection authorities 
for the Article 29 Working Party (“Working Party”) to comment on 
the issue,3 the lead EU administrative data protection body has 
remained silent. In the absence of such guidance from the Working 
Party, litigants in U.S.-EU trans-border disputes are left floundering 
in their attempts to comply with U.S. discovery rules without violating 
EU data protection law. This note sifts through the quagmire of 
regulations to help trans-border litigants view the U.S. discovery-EU 
data protection conflict through a transnational legal lens, and 
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 1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 2. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
 3. Alan Charles Raul & Edward McNicholas, French CNIL Examines Data Protection 
Issues Linked to U.S. Litigation Disclosures, 3 PRIV. & DATA SEC. L.J. 358, 358, 361 (2008) 
(describing the French Data Protection Authority (“CNIL”) analysis of the problem and the 
French push to put the issue on the Working Party's agenda). 
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thereby, construct a strategy for compliance that respects U.S., EU 
and international law. 
This note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the nature and 
scope of the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive conflict and 
investigates its roots in the larger differences between civil and 
common legal systems’ approach to evidence gathering. Part II 
examines possible solutions to the legal quandary posed by the 
conflicting requirements, and Part III constructs the best possible 
compliance strategy for real world litigants. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT CONFLICT AND ITS 
HISTORICAL ROOTS 
Litigants in U.S. courts face strict penalties for failure to comply 
with the discovery process.4 When data involved in the discovery 
process is located or originated in the European Union, these same 
litigants face strict penalties under EU data protection law for 
transferring the data to the United States.5 This places litigants in 
U.S.-EU trans-border disputes in a difficult position. The conflict 
between the two sets of requirements has been a recent source of 
heated debate,6 fueled, in part, by the long-standing disagreement 
between civil and common legal systems over the appropriate nature 
of evidence-gathering procedures. 
A.  The Conflict: EU data protection law confronts U.S. discovery 
rules. 
The European Union began harmonizing the data protection 
laws of its member states with the adoption of Directive 95/46/EC 
(“Privacy Directive”).7 The Privacy Directive restricts the transfer 
 
 4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. 
 5. For example, the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) fined Tyco Healthcare      
€ 30,000 (approximately $40,350) for violations of its data protection law. CNIL, La CNIL 
condamne la société Tyco Healthcare France à 30,000 euros d’amende pour manque de 
coopération et de transparence (May 31, 2007), http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=2206 
&news[cur]=6&news[uid]=440&cHash=20af941343 [hereinafter CNIL, Tyco]. 
 6. See CNIL, Discovery Case: Another Sensitive Issue, www.cnil.fr/index.php?2464 
(describing France's concern over the growing conflict between U.S. discovery rules and the 
privacy of personal data); Michael B. de Leeuw & Phillip A. Wellner, What to do About Data in 
the EU?, N.Y. L.J., May 23, 2008 (detailing the difficulties for EU-U.S. trans-border litigants). 
 7. Council Directive 95/46, on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter 
Privacy Directive]. The Privacy Directive creates an administrative data protection authority for 
the entire European Union, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (“Working Party”). 
See id. art. 29 (creating the Working Party).  See also id. arts. 30-31 (detailing the Working 
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and processing of “personal data,” which is broadly defined as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”8  
Privacy Directive Article 25 forbids the transfer of personal data to a 
third country unless the third country provides an adequate level of 
data protection.9 Furthermore, if a specific third country is found to 
lack adequate data protection, EU member states are required to 
take affirmative steps to prevent the transfer of personal data to that 
country.10 The EU position is that the United States lacks adequate 
data protection standards.11 As a result, the United States and the 
European Union negotiated a safe harbor mechanism by which 
companies may voluntarily increase their level of data protection and 
become eligible for data transfers from the European Union.12 The 
safe harbor, however, does not cover all sectors of data,13  and, while 
specifically designed to govern data transfers, it also imposes 
restrictions on data processing which render the use of the Safe 
Harbor framework problematic in the U.S. discovery context.14 
 
Party's responsibilities). As part of its mandate, the Working Party issues opinions and 
interpretations of the Privacy Directive and its application. The opinions and recommendations 
of the Working Party are not binding on EU member states. Joseph Cutler & Carla L. Reyes, 
Was That Your Computer Talking to Me? The EU and IP Addresses as “Personal Data”, 
CYBERSPACE Law., Aug. 2008, at 1, 5 (correction printed in Note from the Editor, 
CYBERSPACE LAW., Nov. 2008, at 2, 3). Nonetheless, “the Working Party opinions are often 
adopted by Members States and influence EU policy making in the privacy field.” Id. 
 8. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 2(a). Furthermore, "an identifiable natural person 
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or . . . one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity." Id. Thus, to qualify as personal data, the Working Party requires that 
the data fit within each of the following criteria: (1) any information, (2) relating to, (3) an 
identified or identifiable, (4) natural person. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
[hereinafter Working Party], Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, at 6, 
01248/07/EN, WP 136 (June 20, 2007) [hereinafter WP 136] (detailing the specific requirements 
for meeting each of the four criteria). 
 9. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 25(1). 
 10. Id. art. 25(4). 
 11. Working Party, Opinion 10/2006 on the Processing of Personal Data by the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), at 21, 01935/06/EN, WP 128 (Nov. 
22, 2006) [hereinafter WP 128]. 
 12. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000), 
www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_Privacy.asp [hereinafter Safe Harbor Principles]. 
 13. Id. at pmbl. (defining "personal data" as "data about an identified or identifiable 
individual that are within the scope of the Directive, received by a U.S. organization from the 
European Union, and recorded in any form"). 
 14. See generally Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 12 (detailing requirements for onward 
transfers to be lawfully made and imposing restrictions on how that data can be further 
processed). 
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The Privacy Directive also places a variety of restrictions on the 
processing of personal data. For example, Privacy Directive Article 6 
requires personal data to “be processed fairly and lawfully[,]. . .be 
collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, and not be 
used for incompatible purposes.”15 Furthermore, “the processed data 
must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed.”16  
Additionally, data subjects must have the opportunity to correct 
erroneous data,17 and personal data may not be retained longer than 
necessary.18 
The Privacy Directive restrictions on transfers and processing of 
personal data pose a problem for litigants involved in U.S.-EU trans-
border litigation. First, the Privacy Directive transfer provisions 
restrict the scope of discoverable data.  Second, because “processing” 
is defined as the “collection, recording, organization, storage, 
adaptation, or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment 
or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction” of personal data,19 
the processing requirements apply to “virtually any action that a U.S. 
litigator would take” in preparation for trial.20 
Thus, parties to U.S.-EU trans-border litigation may not be able 
to comply with U.S. discovery requirements without violating EU 
data protection law. However, full compliance with the Privacy 
Directive may require refusal to comply with a U.S. discovery 
request.  Notably, entities subject to the Privacy Directive face strict 
monetary penalties for any violation,21 and failure to comply with U.S. 
discovery requests can result in “severe sanctions, including contempt 
proceedings, monetary fines, prosecution for obstruction of justice, 
 
 15. Working Party, Opinion 1/2006 on the Application of EU Data Protection rules to 
Internal Whistleblowing Schemes in the Fields of Accounting, Internal Accounting Controls, 
Auditing Matters, Fight Against Bribery, Banking and Financial Crime, at 9, 00195/06/EN, WP 
117 (Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter WP 117] (citing Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 6). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 14. 
 18. Id. at 12. 
 19. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 2(b). 
 20. Leeuw & Wellner, supra note 6. 
 21. For example, the Italian data protection authority fined GS, a supermarket chain, 
54,000 euros for violations of the Italian legislation implementing the Privacy Directive.  
ADDLESHAW GODDARD, DATA AND INFORMATION UPDATE 14 (2008), http://www.addlesha 
wgoddard.com/asset_store/document/data_information_update_summer_08_101528.pdf. 
In France, CNIL has also fined companies. See CNIL, Tyco, supra note 5. 
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prejudicial jury instructions, and dismissal of claims.”22 Litigants are 
therefore left to decide which set of laws to violate – EU data 
protection or U.S. discovery. 
B.  The U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive conflict is part of a 
larger disjunction between common and civil legal approaches to 
evidence gathering. 
The tension between EU data protection law and U.S. discovery 
rules presents a new manifestation of an enduring conflict between 
civil and common law evidence-gathering procedures. The differences 
in common and civil legal systems with regard to evidence gathering 
have been the source of tension for decades. At its core, the 
disagreement centers not on the goals of evidence gathering, but on 
the mechanism for achieving those goals. 
The United States, a common law jurisdiction, employs an 
evidence-gathering procedure referred to as pre-trial discovery.23 Pre-
trial discovery is the gathering of evidence after a lawsuit is filed but 
prior to trial.24 The United States adopted pre-trial discovery 
procedures to encourage the free flow of information, truth-finding, 
and informational equity between parties.25 Specifically, the pre-trial 
discovery rules embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure26 
allow litigants to obtain any information relevant to the claim or 
defense of a party.27 To be discoverable, information need not be 
admissible at trial; it must only be relevant and reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.28 Notably, the scope 
of information potentially covered by the discovery rules is extremely 
broad, and it is the parties themselves that gather the evidence.29 
 
 22. Stanley W. Crosley, Alan Charles Raul, Edward R. McNicholas & Julie M. Dwyer, A 
Path to Resolving European Data Protection Concerns with U.S. Discovery, 6 BNA PRIVACY & 
SEC. L. REP. 1, 2 (2007), available at http://www.sidley.com/files/Publication/7ed26a68-1ec7-
44eb-9db6-3660d938f575/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/166eaabb-2a74-43fe-8a963d78194 
ec198/EuroDataProtection.pdf. 
 23. Stephen F. Black, United States Transnational Discovery: The Rise and Fall of the 
Hague Evidence Convention, 40 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 901, 902 (1991). 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 902-03. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
 27. Id. R. 26(b)(1). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. R. 26(a) (describing duty of one party to disclose to the others); id. R. 26(b)(1) 
(detailing the scope of discoverable information). 
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These two aspects of the discovery process give rise to most of the 
objections raised by civil law countries, which view the scope of U.S. 
discovery as intrusive and the identity of the fact-finder 
inappropriate.30 
Civil law countries also seek to promote justice through rules of 
civil procedure, but they do so in an entirely different fashion. First, 
most civil law countries view evidence gathering as a sovereign 
function best carried out by an active judge.31 Typically, in civil 
systems “the judge questions the witnesses and decides which 
documents to request.”32 Because of this active role, the scope of 
discovery is naturally limited in civil law systems by the discretion of 
the judge, and foreign litigators often view the U.S. discovery process, 
placed in the hands of the parties, “as fostering ‘fishing expeditions’ 
by U.S. lawyers eager to build a case and perhaps impose costs on 
their adversaries.”33 Some countries, such as France, so vehemently 
oppose the U.S. discovery model that they enacted statutes 
specifically designed to block the application of U.S. discovery rules 
to their citizens.34 
Given the historical tension between U.S. discovery rules and 
European approaches to evidence gathering, it is unsurprising that 
U.S. discovery rules conflict with EU data protection law, since it is 
another area where the European Union views U.S. regulation as 
inadequate. After all, given the general distaste in civil legal systems 
for U.S. discovery procedures, it is only natural that in an area viewed 
as a fundamental human right, such as data privacy, the conflict 
would increasingly grow. The question then becomes not how to 
eliminate the tension, but whether litigants can navigate both sets of 
laws without incurring penalties. 
 
 30. ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N, OBTAINING DISCOVERY ABROAD 
1-2  (2d ed. 2005). 
 31. Id. at 1. See also Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Discovery: Cooperation, Coercion 
and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNT’L L. 239, 242-43 (1986). 
 32. ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 30, at 1. 
 33. Id. at 3. 
 34. For France’s blocking statute, see Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980, Journal Officiel de 
la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 17, 1980, p. 1799. Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom also have blocking statutes. For Switzerland’s blocking statute, see 
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] Nov. 8, 1934, art. 271. For the blocking statute of the 
United Kingdom, see British Protection of Trading Secrets Act, 1980, c. 11. For further 
discussion of blocking statutes, see generally ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N, 
supra note 30. 
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II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE U.S.-EU TRANS-BORDER 
LITIGANT’S LEGAL QUANDARY 
A litigant involved in a U.S.-EU trans-border dispute may 
generally seek to comply with both U.S. discovery rules and the 
Privacy Directive by either persuading U.S. courts to accept restricted 
discovery production or using exceptions to the Privacy Directive to 
fully comply with U.S. discovery rules. A litigant seeking to persuade 
U.S. courts to accept restricted production may seek to either 
substitute the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad 
in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Evidence Convention”) 
procedures for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or obtain a 
protective order on the basis of EU data protection laws. On the 
other hand, a litigant using Privacy Directive exceptions to fully 
comply with U.S. discovery requirements must both use exceptions to 
the Privacy Directive’s transfer provisions to remove restrictions on 
the scope of discovery and justify processing of lawfully transferred 
data under Privacy Directive Article 7. 
Solution A:  Persuade U.S. courts to accept restricted discovery 
   production. 
A litigant in a U.S.-EU trans-border dispute generally has two 
options for persuading U.S. courts to accept restricted discovery 
production. First, the litigant may argue that the Hague Evidence 
Convention governs the dispute rather than the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.35 Alternatively, the litigant may seek a protective order on 
the basis that full discovery will expose the litigant to sanctions in the 
European Union.36 Notably, the first strategy has not yet been used by 
a litigant in the specific context of the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy 
Directive conflict. The second strategy of seeking a protective order, 
however, has been successfully employed by litigants in this context.37 
Option 1: Persuade the court to use the Hague Evidence 
  Convention instead of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Although this option has not yet been pursued by litigants in this 
context, a litigant could overcome the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy 
 
 35. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text. 
 37. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. 
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Directive conflict by persuading the court to use the Hauge Evidence 
Convention instead of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Hague Evidence Convention, concluded on March 18, 1970,38 sought 
to bridge the gap between evidence gathering procedures in civil and 
common law countries by providing three mechanisms to be used in 
either system: letters of request, diplomatic or consular officers, and 
appointed commissioners.39 
The most helpful of these procedures for dealing with a conflict 
between the Privacy Directive and U.S. discovery rules is the letter of 
request. A letter of request is a formal procedure whereby the court 
presiding over a civil or commercial judicial proceeding in one 
country can ask the judicial authority of another country to gather 
evidence for use in the judicial proceeding in the requesting state.40  
Each country that ratified the Hague Evidence Convention 
designated a central authority to which all letters of request are sent 
for execution.41 A letter of request must be executed expeditiously42 
and may only be refused in specific cases.43 However, the person or 
persons from whom the executing country must gather the evidence 
“may refuse to give evidence in so far as he has a privilege or duty to 
refuse to give the evidence . . . under the law of the State of 
execution.”44 
 
 38. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence 
Convention]. 
 39. Id. chs. I, II. 
 40. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Outline of the Hague Convention of 
18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in civil or Commercial Matters (2008), 
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/outline20e.pdf [hereinafter HCCH, Outline of the Hague Evidence 
Convention]. 
 41. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 38, art. 2. 
 42. In order to cut down on the time required to execute a letter of request, the European 
Union issued Council Regulation 1206/2001, Cooperation Between the Courts of the Member 
States in Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L174) 1, 2 [hereinafter 
Evidence Regulation]. The Evidence Regulation replaces the Hague Evidence Convention as 
between EU member states and streamlines the process in order to reduce the time necessary 
for gathering evidence when litigation involves parties in multiple EU member states. Id. 
 43. HCCH, Outline of the Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 40, at 1. A letter of 
request can only be refused in its entirety if execution is not within the function of the judiciary 
or execution would threaten the country's sovereignty or security. See Hague Evidence 
Convention, supra note 38, art. 12. A letter of request cannot be refused in its entirety solely 
because the requested country would not recognize the underlying legal claim or because the 
country asserts it has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter. Id. 
 44. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 38, art. 11. 
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Hague Evidence Convention letters of request can allow litigants 
to fulfill U.S. discovery requirements while simultaneously complying 
with the Privacy Directive in one of two ways: lawfully producing only 
non-personal data, or fully producing all relevant information, 
including personal data, pursuant to an order of an EU Member State 
judicial authority. 
First, if the litigant facing an evidence request from an EU 
Hague Evidence Convention executing authority successfully shows 
that compliance would require the production of personal data in 
violation of the Privacy Directive, the EU executing authority may 
rely on Article 11 of the Hague Evidence Convention and excuse 
production.45 It appears that as long as the letter of request is 
executed to the fullest extent under the executing country’s domestic 
law, U.S. discovery requirements implemented via the Hague 
Evidence Convention are fulfilled without violating the Privacy 
Directive. 
Alternatively, if the EU executing country could be persuaded 
that the personal data sought is vital to establishing a legal claim or 
defense, the executing judicial authority could lawfully order full 
compliance with the letter of request despite the Privacy Directive’s 
transfer and processing restrictions. The Privacy Directive allows 
transfer of personal data to an entity in a third country lacking 
adequate data protection standards if “the transfer is necessary . . . for 
the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims.”46 Additionally, 
processing of personal data is legitimate if it “is necessary for a legal 
obligation to which a data controller is subject.”47 Notably, the legal 
obligation must be one imposed by an EU member state.48 If a 
European judicial authority required production of personal data 
pursuant to a letter of request, the resulting transfer would be for the 
establishment or defense of legal claims and any processing would 
therefore be for compliance with a legal obligation imposed on the 
 
 45. Article 11 of the Hague Evidence Convention states that "[i]n the execution of a Letter 
of Request the person concerned may refuse to give evidence in so far as he has a privilege or 
duty to refuse to give the evidence under the law of the State of execution." Id. 
 46. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(1)(d). 
 47. Id. art. 7(c). 
 48. See WP 117, supra note 15, at 8 ("[A]n obligation imposed by a foreign legal statute or 
regulation . . .  may not qualify as a legal obligation by virtue of which data processing in the EU 
would be made legitimate."). See also WP 128, supra note 11, at 18 (confirming that foreign 
legal obligations do not satisfy Article 7(c) because "[a]ny other interpretation would make it 
easy for foreign rules to circumvent the EU rules laid down in the Directive"). 
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data controller. Under such circumstances, any processing must also 
comply with Privacy Directive requirements that personal data be 
processed fairly and lawfully,49 that it be used only for the purposes 
for which it was received,50 and that no data regarding a person’s 
racial or ethnic origins, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade-
union membership, health, or sex life be processed.51 
Each of these alternatives requires persuading a U.S. court to use 
the Hague Evidence Convention procedures rather than the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the United States ratified the 
Hague Evidence Convention, the Supreme Court has long held that 
“both the discovery rules set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Hague [Evidence] Convention are the law of the 
United States.”52 However, the Hague Evidence Convention was 
meant as “a supplement, not a pre-emptive replacement, for other 
means of obtaining evidence located abroad.”53 As such, the Hague 
Evidence Convention will not automatically apply in trans-border 
litigation, and a party must persuade the court to use letters of 
request instead of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.54 In analyzing 
a party’s motion to use the Hague Evidence Convention in a trans-
border dispute, courts use a three-part test to examine: first, “the 
particular facts of the case, particularly with regard to the  nature of 
the discovery requested,”55 second, “the sovereign interests in issue, 
and,”56 third, “the likelihood that the Convention procedures will 
prove effective.”57 The party moving to substitute the Hague 
 
 49. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 6(a). 
 50. Id. art. 6(b). 
 51. Id. art. 8. At this juncture, it is important to note that Privacy Directive Article 8 
provides three exceptions to its prohibition of processing sensitive data that would allow such 
processing during a lawsuit: (1) the data subject has given his specific consent, (2) “processing is 
necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific rights of the controller in 
the field of employment law insofar as it is authorized by national law providing for adequate 
safeguards,” and (3) “the processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by the 
data subject or is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims.” Id. art. 
8(2)(a), 8(2)(b), 8(2)(e). 
 52. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 
482 U.S. 522, 533 (1987). 
 53. Id. at 536. 
 54. See id. at 533-40. 
 55. In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 354 (D. Conn. 1991). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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Evidence Convention for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bears 
the burden of persuasion.58 
Under the first prong, which requires an examination of the 
nature of the discovery requested, courts will favor the Hague 
Evidence Convention procedures when the discovery calls for broad 
responses rather than being narrowly tailored.59 This result stems 
from the Supreme Court’s requirement that, because of foreign 
litigants’ unfamiliarity with U.S. discovery procedures, “American 
courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, [must] exercise special 
viligance [sic] to protect foreign litigants from the danger that 
unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a 
disadvantageous position.”60 
Under the second prong, “the appropriate inquiry . . . is the ‘host’ 
country’s amenability to the manner of discovery sought to be utilized 
by the plaintiffs.”61 To that end, courts consider the domestic law of 
the host country regarding civil procedure.62 The second prong will 
especially favor the Hague Evidence Convention if the host country 
has directly stated its opposition to U.S. discovery procedures or 
ratified the Hague Evidence Convention with a strong Article 23 
reservation.63 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 354-55. 
 60. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 
482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987). 
 61. Perrier Bottled Water, 138 F.R.D. at 355. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. (noting that France was the most emphatic critic of U.S. discovery procedure, 
adopted a blocking statute, ratified the Hague Evidence Convention, and even adopted laws 
preventing the unauthorized use of procedures other than the Hague Evidence Convention in 
trans-border disputes). 
  Article 23 reservations allow state-parties to the Hague Evidence Convention to 
declare that they will not enforce any pre-trial discovery order.  Some countries have stronger 
Article 23 reservations than others, especially since the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law cleared up the misunderstanding shared by many countries that "pre-trial" 
discovery meant discovery prior to the filing of a legal claim.  For an example of a strong Article 
23 reservation, see that of France, which states: 
In accordance with the provisions of Article 33, the French Government declares: that 
in pursuance of Article 4, para. 2, it will execute Letters of Request only if they are in 
French or if they are accompanied by a translation into French; that, in pursuance of 
Article 23, Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of 
documents as known in Common Law countries will not be executed; 
. . . . 
The declaration made by the French Republic in accordance with Article 23 relating to 
Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents 
does not apply when the requested documents are enumerated limitatively in the 
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Lastly, the third prong will favor the Hague Evidence 
Convention unless there is a fact specific reason the procedures will 
be ineffective.64 An allegation that the Hague Evidence Convention 
procedures will cause time delays is insufficient to cause the third 
prong to favor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.65 
Importantly, if the Hague Evidence Convention is used and the 
U.S. court is not satisfied with the scope of evidence obtained, the 
court retains the power to order production under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.66 If production is ordered, especially after a 
European court relied on the Privacy Directive in refusing to fulfill 
the production requests, compliance would require violating data 
protection laws of the European Union. 
Option 2: Obtain a protective order on the basis of EU data 
   protection law. 
When U.S. discovery requests conflict with the law of a foreign 
nation, U.S. courts sometimes grant a protective order releasing the 
party from its obligation to produce evidence. The party relying on 
foreign law bears the burden of showing that foreign law actually bars 
production of evidence.67 That burden is met by “providing the [c]ourt 
with information of sufficient particularity and specificity to allow the 
 
Letter of Request and have a direct and precise link with the object of the procedure. 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, France's Reservations and Declarations to the 
Hague Evidence Convention, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=501 
&disp=resdn. 
  For an example of a moderate, and more common, Article 23 reservation, see that of 
the United Kingdom, which states: 
In accordance with Article 23 Her Majesty's Government declare that the United 
Kingdom will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-
trial discovery of documents. Her Majesty's Government further declare that Her 
Majesty's Government understand "Letters of Request issued for the purpose of 
obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents" for the purposes of the foregoing 
Declaration as including any Letter of Request which requires a person: (a.) to state 
what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the Letter of Request relates are, 
or have been, in his possession, custody or power; or (b.) to produce any documents 
other than particular documents specified in the Letter of Request as being documents 
appearing to the requested court to be, or to be likely to be, in his possession, custody 
or power. 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, United Kingdom's Reservations and 
Declarations to the Hague Evidence Convention, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.c 
omment&csid=564&disp=resdn. 
 64. Perrier Bottled Water, 138 F.R.D. at 355-56. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 356. 
 67. Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing United States v. Vetco, 691 
F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
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[c]ourt to determine whether the discovery sought is indeed 
prohibited by foreign law.”68 In meeting this burden, it is helpful to 
obtain a statement from the foreign country that its law actually bars 
disclosure of the information.69 
Even if the party resisting discovery proves a conflict between 
U.S. and foreign law, the court retains the power to deny the 
protective order.  In deciding how to rule, the court engages in a case-
specific analysis of five factors:70 first, “the importance to the 
investigation or litigation of the documents or other information 
requested,”71 second, “the degree of specificity of the request,”72 third, 
whether the information originated in the United States,73 fourth, the 
availability of alternative means of securing the information,”74 and 
fifth, “the extent to which noncompliance with the request would 
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance 
with the request would undermine important interests of the state 
where the information is located.”75 
The first factor regarding the importance of discovery usually 
weighs in favor of parties resisting the production of documents that 
may aid in proving their own claim or defense.76 When parties resist 
the production of documents that will hurt their case, this first factor 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. 1995) (noting that 
Germany's amicus brief declaring disclosure would violate the German Data Protection Act 
made the conflict between the U.S. discovery order and foreign law obvious); Alfadda, 149 
F.R.D. at 34-35 (finding that the failure of the Swiss government to submit a statement that 
disclosure of the information at issue threatened their national interests evidenced that no 
threat existed). 
 70. Courts have adopted these factors from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations.  
See Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 902; Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 
2468, 1474-75 (1992) (citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aeropostale v. U.S. Dist. of Iowa, 
482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987) as the key case anticipating the adoption of the Restatement 
(Third) factors by U.S. Courts). See also Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 34 (relying on a modified 
version of the Restatement factors). The adoption of the Restatement (Third) factors is a natural 
progression from the earlier use of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations, upon which 
the Restatement (Third) was built. See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 
F.R.D. 42, 45 (1984); Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1288. 
 71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442(1)(c) (1987). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See generally Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212-13 (1958) (citing an 
example where unproduced information may have been helpful to the resisting party’s own 
cause). 
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weighs in favor of denying the protective order.77 Furthermore, 
“[c]ourts have refused to require production where the documents 
sought are largely cumulative of records already produced.”78 Under 
the second factor, the key inquiry is “how burdensome it will be to 
respond to [the] request.”79 In particular,”[g]eneralized searches for 
information are discouraged,”80 and overbroad requests will be 
disfavored as abusive and overly intrusive.81 The third factor will 
usually weigh in favor of granting the protective order when the 
discoverable material originated in the foreign nation and remains 
there, beyond the scope of U.S. jurisdiction.82 
The fourth factor requires courts to “consider whether 
substantially equivalent alternate means for obtaining the requested 
information are available.”83 It often causes courts “considerable 
discomfort to think that a court of law should order a violation of law, 
particularly on the territory of the sovereign whose law is in 
question,” and courts seek to avoid such orders whenever possible.84  
If a court feels that an alternative means of producing the information 
is equivalent to the one requested and will not violate foreign law, 
this fourth factor will weigh in favor of granting the protective order.85 
When evaluating the fifth factor, the effect of the court’s action 
on U.S. and foreign interests, U.S. interests are weighed against the 
 
 77. See United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981) (relying on the fact 
that the documents Vetco sought not to produce were relevant to proving their tax liability in 
determining that the importance of the documents weighed in favor of denying the protective 
order). 
 78. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (1992); Vetco, 691 
F.2d. at 1290 (using the Restatement (Second) factor, “importance of documents,” which 
eventually became the first factor in the Restatement (Third) test). 
 79. Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1475. 
 80. Id. 
 81. In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 354-55 (D. Conn. 1991). 
 82. Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900, 902-03 (Tex. 1995) (using the fact that the 
eleven materials sought were in Germany to support a decision that the trial court abused its 
discretion in issuing the production order). See also Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1475 (“The fact that 
all the information to be disclosed (and the people who will be deposed or who will produce the 
documents) are located in a foreign country weighs against the disclosure . . . .”). 
 83. Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290 (relying on the Restatment (Second) version of this factor).  
Vetco’s formulation of this test was retained after the move from the Restatement (Second) to 
the Restatement (Third) and thus continues to be the test under the Restatement (Third)’s fourth 
factor. Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1475 (citing Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290) (“[T]he alternative means 
must be “substantially equivalent” to the requested discovery.”). 
 84. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. 1987). 
 85. See generally Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 903 (holding that the company was not 
required to produce a German copy of a document when its American equivalent was 
available). 
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interests of the foreign sovereign. The U.S. interest is generally 
articulated as “ensuring parties a full and fair adjudication of their 
case.”86 In assessing the interests of the foreign sovereign, U.S. courts 
value input from the foreign government. In fact, the party seeking 
the protective order is more likely to prevail if the foreign sovereign 
submits a statement or otherwise expresses that violating the foreign 
law, even to comply with a U.S. discovery order, severely undermines 
sovereign interests.87 The party seeking the protective order is also 
more likely to prevail if the very act of producing documents will 
violate foreign law, rather than when foreign law requires an event to 
trigger a violation, such as a report or return to the home country.88 
Lastly, apart from any formal factors, courts are more likely to 
grant a protective order to a party which, although resisting discovery, 
notably made good faith efforts to comply with the discovery process 
to the greatest possible extent.89 
Two courts have granted protective orders specifically on the 
basis of EU data protection laws. In Volkswagen v. Valdez, 
Volkswagen objected to a discovery request for its current corporate 
telephone book containing the names, work telephone numbers, and 
home telephone numbers of over 20,000 employees.90 Using the five-
factor test, the court ruled in favor of Volkswagen. Agreeing with a 
brief submitted by Germany, the court found that: production of the 
book would violate German data protection law,91 sufficiently 
equivalent alternative production methods had already been used by 
 
 86. ANTIRUST LAW SECTION OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 30, at 58 (citing Minpecov. 
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 667 F. Supp 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
 87. See Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 902-03. See also Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34-35 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (counting the fifth factor against the party resisting discovery because, in part, 
Switzerland did not submit a statement that violation of the secrecy laws would seriously 
undermine Swiss interests). In many instances, U.S. courts view these statements from the 
foreign soverign as confirmation that an important foreign national interest exists apart from a 
general dislike of U.S. pre-trial discovery. ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N., 
supra note 30, at 57. When the foreign law at issue is a blocking statute, U.S. courts will 
generally give the foreign interest less weight. Id. at 53. Genuine concern for data privacy, on 
the other hand, will generally be respected; however, U.S. courts appreciate confirmation that 
the law at issue represents the latter rather than the former. Id. 
 88. See Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290; Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 35. 
 89. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2dat 498. See Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 903; Alfadda, 149 
F.R.D. at 40. 
 90. Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 901. 
 91. Id. at 902-03. 
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Volkswagen,92 and production of the current corporate book was 
requested solely to enable the plaintiffs to re-check the information 
already discovered through other sources.93 
Similarly, in Salerno v. Lecia, the court denied a motion to 
compel discovery because production of the documents requested 
would violate both the Privacy Directive and the German Data 
Protection Act.94 Although the court did not specifically rely on the 
five-factor test when conducting its analysis, it did find that the 
European Union had overtly expressed its interests in upholding the 
Privacy Directive, alternative methods of production were not 
sufficiently equivalent, and serious ramifications exist for violating 
the Privacy Directive and its implementing legislation such as the 
German Data Protection Act.95 
As the above discussion reveals, U.S. courts can be persuaded to 
accept restricted production, whether by protective order or 
substitution of the Hague Evidence Convention Procedures for the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such decisions to restrict 
production, however, are within the discretion of the court, leaving 
litigants vulnerable to violations of EU data protection law in the 
absence of a favorable ruling. As a result, it is important to also 
examine the possible solutions to the U.S.-EU trans-border litigants’ 
legal quandary provided by the EU Privacy Directive. 
Solution B: Use exceptions to the Privacy Directive to fully comply 
  with the U.S. discovery requirements. 
If the U.S. court requires the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be 
used instead of the Hague Evidence Convention and denies the 
protective order, a litigant may nevertheless attempt to fully comply 
with U.S. discovery requirements by relying on exceptions to the 
Privacy Directive. In order to fully comply with the Privacy Directive, 
however, the litigant must both establish that an exception to the 
transfer restrictions in Article 25 applies and justify processing under 
Article 7.96 
 
 92. Id. at 903. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Salerno v. Lecia, Inc., No. 97-CV-973S(H) 1999 WL 299306, *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 1999). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, arts. 7, 25. 
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 Part 1: Use exceptions to the Privacy Directive transfer 
provisions to remove the restrictions on the scope of 
personal data available for discovery. 
The Privacy Directive prohibits the onward transfer of personal 
data originating in the European Union to third countries lacking 
adequate data protection.97 Nevertheless, such transfers can lawfully 
occur under the Privacy Directive framework. There are three 
alternatives for lawfully transferring personal data to third countries 
lacking adequate data protection; however, the Working Party has 
created an order of preference for these alternatives.98 The most 
favored method for onward transfers to the United States, a country 
lacking adequate data protection, is transferring data to an entity 
participating in the safe harbor program.99 If use of the safe harbor is 
not available, the Working Party recommends using the derogations 
listed in Privacy Directive Article 26(2).100 According to the Working 
Party, the third method, the exceptions in Privacy Directive Article 
26(1), should only be used as a last resort.101 
Option A: Safe Harbor. 
Although the Working Party prefers that transfers to U.S. 
entities take place through the safe harbor mechanism, the safe 
harbor was not designed to encompass transfers for compliance with 
U.S. discovery requirements.102 The safe harbor mechanism creates a 
presumption of adequate data protection standards in any U.S. entity 
that adopts the required processing principles and allows EU entities 
to transfer personal data to qualified U.S. entities without violating 
the Privacy Directive.103 Thus, conceivably, if the United States party 
to a U.S.-EU trans-border dispute qualified under the safe harbor 
mechanism, direct transfers between the parties would be covered.  
However, transfers to opposing counsel or a U.S. court would be 
considered additional onward transfers and be specifically prohibited 
 
 97. Id. art. 25. 
 98. Working Party, Working Document on a Common Interpretation of Article 26(1) of 
Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, at 9, 2093/05/EN, WP 114 (Nov. 25, 2005) [hereinafter 
WP 114]. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 12. 
 103. Id. 
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under the terms of the safe harbor principles.104 As a result, the safe 
harbor mechanism is of little utility in the U.S. discovery context.105 
 
Option B: Rely on Privacy Directive Article 26(2) derogations to 
   create an alternative structure for the transfer of 
   personal data  to litigants in the United States. 
Article 26(2) allows “transfers to a ‘non-adequate’ third country 
‘where the controller adduces adequate safeguards with respect to the 
protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individuals and as regards the exercise of the corresponding rights.’”106  
The Working Party has identified two types of adequate safeguards a 
controller may adopt in order to satisfy the Article 26(2) derogation 
from Article 25: contractual clauses and binding corporate rules.107 
Contractual clauses. In order to constitute an “adequate 
safeguard” under Article 26(2), a contractual clause must 
“determin[e] how the responsibility for data protection compliance is 
split between the two parties [and] provide additional safeguards for 
the data subject made necessary by the fact that the recipient in the 
third country is not subject to an enforceable set of data protection 
 
 104. Id. The Safe Harbor Onward Transfer Principle allows, under certain conditions, a 
safe-harbor participating organization to transfer data to third parties not participating in the 
Safe Harbor for processing. If the non-safe-harbor participating third party is acting as the 
organization’s agent, data may be transferred to it for processing if the participating 
organization first ascertains that the non-safe-harbor third party is obligated to uphold the 
principles of the Privacy Directive, either by application of another law or by contractual 
obligations between the parties. Id. If, however "the [participating] organization knew or should 
have known the third party would process it in" a way contrary to the Privacy Directive, the 
participating organization will be held responsible for the third party’s violations. Id. This is 
helpful in the U.S. discovery-Privacy Directive context because it allows transfers of data from 
the participating organization to their U.S. legal counsel under the Safe Harbor provisions when 
the U.S. legal counsel is being retained as an agent of the participating organization and 
contractually agrees to provide the same level of protection as the Safe Harbor Principles.  
Transfers to non-participating third parties that are not acting as the participating organization’s 
agent may also occur as long as the participating organization complies with the Notice and 
Choice principles of the Safe Harbor. Id. This exception, however, has little application in the 
U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive context, as U.S. courts disfavor subjecting the discovery 
process to the consent of the data subject. 
 105. See Leeuw & Wellner, supra note 6 (arguing briefly that the safe harbor mechanism 
does not control the discovery process and "is, in fact, incompatible with, typical discovery in 
the U.S."). 
 106. Working Party, Working Document on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: 
Applying Articles 25 & 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive, at 15, DG XV D/5025/98, WP 12 
(July 24, 1998) [hereinafter WP 12]. 
 107. WP 114, supra note 98, at 5. See also Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(2). 
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rules providing an adequate level of protection.”108 Specifically, the 
contract must provide substantive data protection,109 provide redress 
to the data subject,110 and provide support to the affected data 
subjects.111 While contractual clauses are generally favored by the 
Working Party112 and standard contractual clauses have been 
formulated to encourage their standardized use,113 there are two 
situations in which the Working Party finds them unworkable: first, 
when no supervisory body exists in the third country in which the data 
recipient is located114 and second, where the third country authorities 
possess the power to access information which “go[es] beyond those 
permitted by internationally accepted standards of human rights 
protection.”115 
Given the long-standing disagreement between civil and 
common legal systems’ approach to evidence gathering116 and the 
Working Party’s specific disapproval of data protection standards in 
the context of U.S. legal investigations,117 it is likely that the United 
 
 108. WP 12, supra note 106, at 16. 
 109. Id. at 17-20. The contract must provide for the following substantive data protection 
principles: the purpose limitation principle, the data quality and proportionality principle, the 
transparency principle, the security principle, the rights of access, rectification and opposition, 
and restrictions on onward transfers, with possible additional principles needed for sensitive 
data, direct marketing, and automated individual decisions. Id. at 6-7. 
 110. Id. at 18-20. This refers to enforcement mechanisms so that data subjects whose rights 
have been violated can seek redress. Id. 
 111. Id. at 20. This refers to an institutional mechanism providing for complaint 
investigation and a mechanism for compensating data subjects whose rights have been violated.  
Id. 
 112. Working Party, Working Document: Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: 
Applying Article 26(2) of the EU Data Protection Directive to Binding Corporate Rules for 
International Data Transfers, at 6, 11639/02/EN, WP 74 (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter WP 74] 
(stating that Safe Harbor and contracts are both adequate safeguards which are preferred over 
binding corporate rules). 
 113. Commission Decision 2001/497, On Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of 
Personal Data to Third Countries Under Directive 95/46/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 181) 19 (creating a 
set of standard contractual clauses); Commission Decision 2004/915, Amending Decision 
2001/497/ED as Regards the Introduction of an Alternative Set of Standard Contractual Clauses 
for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 74. 
 114. WP 12, supra note 106, at 22. 
 115. Id. at 23. 
 116. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text. 
 117. See WP 117, supra note 15, at 5, 8, 11 (describing the conflict between U.S. 
whistleblowing schemes and the Privacy Directive and pointing out specific problems with 
anonymous reports). See also WP 128, supra note 11, at 8-9, 18-22 (describing how the Society 
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication’s (“SWIFT”) compliance with 
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States would be considered a third country that falls within both of 
the unworkable situations for standard contractual clauses. As a 
result, the standard contractual clauses will provide little relief for 
litigants facing the U.S. discovery-Privacy Directive conflict. 
Binding corporate rules.118 Intended as a tool only to be used 
when the safe harbor and contractual clauses are particularly 
problematic,119 binding corporate rules are best suited to deal with 
“the international transfer of personal data within the same corporate 
group at a multinational level.”120 In order to create an “adequate 
safeguard” under Article 26(2), the binding corporate rules must be 
approved by the relevant national data protection authority.121 The 
national data protection authority will only approve such schemes if 
they are binding both internally within the group and externally in a 
court of law.122 Additionally, the binding corporate rules must provide 
for: audits,123 cooperation with data protection authorities,124 a clearly 
delineated complaint handling department,125 and mechanisms 
providing redress and appropriate compensation to data subjects 
when necessary.126 
Importantly for the U.S. discovery context, binding corporate 
rules only make transfers within the corporate group lawful under 
Article 26(2), not all transfers.127 Thus, while a party to U.S. litigation 
 
subpoenas from the U.S. Treasury violated the Privacy Directive because SWIFT did not use an 
adequate safeguard when transferring the data to the U.S. government). 
 118. Note that the term "binding corporate rules" is meant to encompass policies akin to 
codes of conduct, but the Working Party did not want to confuse their discussion with Article 
27, so it used the term "binding corporate rules." WP 74, supra note 112, at 8. 
 119. Id. at 6. 
 120. Id. at 5. 
 121. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(1). See also WP 114, supra note 98, at 5; WP 74, 
supra note 112, at 5 (“Data protection authorities receive requests for authorization for the 
transfer of personal data to third countries within the meaning of Article 26(2) of the 
directive.”). 
 122. WP 74, supra note 112, at 10-11. As regards the externally binding aspect of the binding 
corporate rules, data subjects must be regarded in law as third party beneficiaries of the rules 
with certain rights. Id. at 12. See also id. at 12 n.12. 
 123. Id. at 16. 
 124. Id. at 17. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 18. Data subjects must also be entitled to take action against the controller. See 
id. at 19. Furthermore, data subjects must be told of the transfers and the controller needs proof 
that data subjects were so informed. Id. 
 127. Id. at 9 ("Transfers of personal data to companies outside the corporate groups would 
remain possible but not on the basis of the arrangements put in place by legally enforceable 
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might be able to gather discoverable materials through the use of 
binding corporate rules, it could not transfer the discoverable 
materials to the parties in the litigation not bound by the rules, or 
their counsel.  Thus, although binding corporate rules are encouraged 
by the Working Party over the exceptions found in Article 26(1),128 
they have limited utility in the U.S. discovery context. 
Option C: Rely on Privacy Directive Article 26(1) exceptions to 
fully excuse the transfer of personal data to litigants in 
the United States. 
Article 26(1) of the Privacy Directive provides exceptions to the 
requirement in Article 25 that onward transfers of personal data 
originating in the European Union only be to countries providing an 
adequate level of data protection.129 However, as a matter of general 
EU legal interpretation, exceptions from a general rule “must be 
interpreted restrictively.”130 As such, the Working Party insists that 
Article 26(1) can only be applied appropriately when recourse to the 
Article 26(2) “framework is impossible in practice, where the risks to 
the data subject are small and Articles 6, 7, and 8 applied 
 
corporate rules but on the basis of any other legitimate grounds under Article 26 of the 
Directive . . . ."). 
 128. The Working Party has issued several documents instructing how to comply with the 
requirements for binding corporate rules in hopes of encouraging corporate groups to adopt 
them when applicable. See Working Party, Working Document on Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQs) Related to Binding Corporate Rules, 1271-00-02/08/EN, WP 155 (June 24, 2008) 
(clarifying “particular requirements for applicants in order to assist them in gaining approval for 
their BCRs”); Working Party, Working Document Setting Up a Framework for the Structure of 
Binding Corporate Rules, 1271-00-01/08/EN, WP 154 (June 24, 2008) (suggesting “what the 
BCRs might look like when incorporating all of the necessary elements identified in documents 
WP 74 and WP 108”); Working Party, Working Document Setting Up a Table with the Elements 
and Principles to be Found in Binding Corporate Rules, 1271-00-00/08/EN, WP 153 (June 24, 
2008) (clarifying and synthesizing Working Party statements on the necessary content of binding 
corporate rules); Working Party, Recommendation 1/2007 on the Standard Application for 
Approval of Binding Corporate Rules for the Transfer of Personal Data, WP 133 (Jan. 10, 2007) 
(creating a standard document for applying to Data Protection Authorities for the approval of 
binding corporate rules); Working Party, Working Document Setting Forth a Co-Operation 
Procedure for Issuing Common Opinions on Adequate Safeguards Resulting From "Binding 
Corporate Rules," 05/EN, WP 107 (Apr. 14, 2005) (creating a procedure for synthesizing the 
data protection authority approval process in multiple E.U. countries); Working Party, Working 
Document Establishing a Model Checklist Application for Approval of Binding Corporate Rules, 
05/EN, WP 108 (Apr. 14, 2005) [hereinafter WP 108] (creating a checklist for compliance with 
the requirements for binding corporate rules); WP 74, supra note 112 (describing briefly the 
content necessary for Binding Corporate Rules). 
 129. WP 114, supra note 98, at 6. 
 130. Id. at 7. 
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appropriately.”131 Additionally, EU member states can provide, via 
domestic law, for the exceptions not to apply in certain cases.132  
Furthermore, when an entity relies on Article 26(1), the authorities 
can, with sufficient reason, “intervene at any time and recommend 
that an international transfer of data should be carried out on the 
basis of adequate safeguards in the meaning of Article 26(2) rather 
than by applying the exceptions listed in Article 26(1).”133 
Despite the many restrictions accompanying the Article 26(1) 
exceptions, it appears that two exemptions may apply to onward 
transfers of personal data originating in the European Union to U.S. 
entities for discovery purposes: consent under Article 26(1)(a), and 
establishing a legal claim or defense under Article 26(1)(d). 
Article 26(1)(a) – Consent. To rely on this exception, consent 
must be obtained from each data subject affected by the transfer.134  
Consent usually cannot be implied,135 but instead must be freely given, 
specific, and informed.136 Consent is only considered freely given if it 
was given prior to the transfer, the data subject truly had the ability to 
withhold consent without suffering harm, and the data subject retains 
the right to withdraw consent at any point.137 The consent must be 
specific in the sense that the data subject authorizes a particular 
transfer or a category of transfers.138 Lastly, the data subject must 
have given consent after receiving information regarding the transfer 
recipient’s purpose and identity, and the specific risk resulting from 
the fact that the data is being transferred to a country providing 
inadequate data protection.139 
The Privacy Directive exception for consent is unreliable in the 
U.S. discovery context for two reasons. First, in conformance with the 
Privacy Directive, the data subject retains the right to withdraw 
consent at any time. A withdrawal of consent would mean that the 
party that received the data must delete it, rendering it useless in a 
 
 131. Id. at 9. 
 132. Id. at 7. 
 133. Id. at 10. 
 134. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(1)(a) (allowing transfers to inadequate third 
countries if "the data subject has given his consent") (emphasis added). See also WP 114, supra 
note 98, at 10-12 (describing the content to be obtained from each data subject). 
 135. WP 12, supra note 106, at 24. 
 136. WP 114, supra note 98, at 11-12. 
 137. See id. at 10-11. 
 138. Id. at 12. 
 139. Id. 
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litigation context. Second, U.S. courts generally disfavor allowing the 
discovery process to be dictated by the will of third parties. In fact, 
one court went so far as to say that “attempting to obtain consents 
from affected third parties is not an alternate means of production” 
because “[i]t may limit the information obtainable.”140 As such, the 
consent exception of Article 26(1)(a) has limited utility in the context 
of the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive conflict. 
Article 26(1)(d) – Establishing a Legal Claim or Defense. Article 
26(1)(d) allows transfers to a third country lacking adequate 
standards of data protection when “the transfer is necessary . . . for 
the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims.”141 To rely on 
this exception, the receiving entity must be party to a present legal 
proceeding, not an anticipated proceeding.142 Furthermore, this 
exception can only be invoked if the parties have complied with the 
Hague Evidence Convention.143 To explain the reach of this 
exception, the Working Party used the following hypothetical: where 
“the parent company of a multinational group established in a third 
country [is] sued by an employee of the group currently posted to one 
of its European subsidiaries. The exception in Article 26(1)(d) 
appears to allow the company to legally request the European 
subsidiary to transfer certain data relating to the employee if these 
data are necessary for its defense.”144 In this hypothetical, once the 
data is lawfully transferred to the parent company headquartered in 
the United States, the data would then be subject to the U.S. 
discovery process. 
The Privacy Directive exception for the establishment of a legal 
claim or defense is the most reliable exception to the Article 25 
prohibition on transfers to third parties in countries with inadequate 
data protection in the U.S. discovery-Privacy Directive context. The 
Working Party specifically indicated that Article 26(1)(d) 
encompasses cross-border litigation through the use of the above 
hypothetical. The key to successfully relying on this exception is 
overcoming a common misunderstanding as to the meaning of the 
 
 140. United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 141. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(1)(d). See also WP 12, supra note 106, at 25. 
 142. WP 114, supra note 98, at 15 (stating that the exception cannot be used to justify 
transfers of data "on the grounds of the possibility that such legal proceedings might be brought 
some day"). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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term “pre-trial discovery” in the U.S. legal system.145 Many countries 
with civil legal systems understand this term to mean document 
recovery before a suit is filed, which the Working Party has 
specifically stated is not encompassed by the Article 26(1)(d) 
exception.146 It behooves litigants relying on this exception, therefore, 
to demonstrate through detailed documentation and provision of the 
court record to the relevant data protection authority that the data 
sought is part of an ongoing legal proceeding. 
 Part 2:  Use Privacy Directive Article (7) to justify processing of 
lawfully transferred data by litigants in preparation for 
trial. 
Even when personal data is lawfully transferred to a non-
adequate third country pursuant to one of the three Privacy Directive 
alternatives, any processing conducted by the receiving entity must 
also be lawful.  When data is transferred pursuant to the safe harbor, 
the processing principles set forth in that mechanism apply and would 
only permit processing that is consistent with the specific purposes for 
which the data was collected.147 When data is transferred pursuant to 
an Article 26(2) “adequate safeguard,” the Privacy Directive 
processing principles apply in full.148 When data is transferred 
pursuant to an Article 26(1) exception, however, only Articles 6, 7, 
and 8 apply to the processing of the transferred data.149 Notably, for 
data to be lawfully processed under any of these three transfer 
schemes, processing must satisfy the Article 7 test of legitimate 
purposes.150 In the U.S. discovery context, there are three possible 
justifications for processing discoverable personal data under Privacy 
Directive Article 7: first, “necessary for compliance with a legal 
 
 145. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Adopted by the Special Commission on the Practical Operation of the Hague Apostille, Evidence 
and Service Conventions, ¶ 31 (Oct. 28-Nov. 30, 2003), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/lse_ 
concl_e.pdf. 
 146. WP 114, supra note 98, at 15. 
 147. Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 12. 
 148. See WP 114, supra note 98, at 5 (noting that Article 26(2) adequate safeguards “ensure 
that the indifiduals in question continue to be protected as regards processing of their data, once 
the data has have been transferred”). 
 149. Id. at 8 (noting compliance with Articles 6 and 8 is required); Working Party, Opinion 
8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context, at 26, 5062/01/EN/Final, 
WP 48 (Sept. 13, 2001) [hereinafter WP 48] (noting that Article 7 must also be complied with). 
 150. WP 48, supra note 149, at 26 (“It must be remembered that whatever the basis of the 
transfer under Articles 25 and 26, processing involved in the transfer must still satisfy Article 6 
to 8.”). 
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obligation to which the controller is subject,”151 second, unambiguous 
consent of the data subject,152 and third, “necessary for the legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller.”153 
Option A: Legal obligations under Privacy Directive Article 7(c). 
Article 7(c) authorizes a data controller to process personal data 
if it is “necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the 
controller is subject.”154 The Working Party has twice stated that “an 
obligation imposed by a foreign legal statute or regulation . . . may 
not qualify as a legal obligation by virtue of which data processing in 
the European Union would be made legitimate.”155 Privacy Directive 
Article 7(c) can only provide an avenue of relief for litigants facing 
the U.S. discovery-Privacy Directive conflict if the U.S. discovery 
request is enforced against the data controller by an EU judicial 
authority pursuant to a letter of request under the Hague 
Convention.156 
 Option B: Unambiguous consent - Privacy Directive Article 7(a). 
Article 7(a) of the Privacy Directive provides that processing of 
personal data is lawful if the data subject gives unambiguous consent 
to the processing.157 Like the Article 26(1)(a) consent exception to the 
transfer of personal data, Article 7(a) requires that the consent be 
freely given, specific, and informed.158 Depending on the nature of the 
data involved in the discovery requests, litigants can seek consent 
from the data subjects themselves. In fact, litigants in several cases 
 
 151. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 7(c). 
 152. Id. art. 7(a). 
 153. Id. art. 7(f). 
 154. Id. art. 7(c). 
 155. WP 117, supra note 15, at 8. See also WP 128, supra note 11, at 18 (confirming that a 
U.S. subpoena will not trigger the Article 7(c) exception because it is a foreign legal obligation 
rather than a legal obligation arising within the European Union). 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37. Notably, Article 7(c) could also be used 
where an EU member state imposes national legal obligations that are the same as U.S. legal 
obligations. See WP 117, supra note 15, at 8 (noting that although U.S. Sarbanes Oxley 
whistleblowing schemes do not satisfy Article 7(c), EU whistleblowing schemes in the form of 
national law in the same fields as Sarbanes Oxley would). However, the nature of the conflict 
between U.S. discovery mechanisms and those employed in civil legal systems and the conflict 
between U.S. and EU regulatory approaches to data protection law makes it unlikely that 
Article 7(c) can be relied upon in that context. 
 157. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 7(a). 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37. 
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employed this technique. While some U.S. courts consider such 
efforts evidence of a good-faith attempt to comply with U.S. 
discovery procedures,159 other courts have ruled that “attempting to 
obtain consents from affected third parties is not an alternate means 
of production” because “[i]t may limit the information obtainable.”160  
In this way, reliance on Article 7(a) may be appropriate in some 
cases, but not in others. 
Option C: Preparation of a legal claim or defense under Privacy 
   Directive Article 7(f). 
Article 7(f) provides that processing of personal data is lawful if 
“necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are 
disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests 
for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.”161 The 
Working Party has recognized that an entity subject to both U.S. and 
EU jurisdictions has “a legitimate interest in complying with 
subpoenas under U.S. law.”162 In making this determination, the 
Working Party found it particularly important that failure to comply 
with U.S. subpoenas could lead to strict U.S. legal sanctions.163  
Similarly, litigants in a civil or commercial dispute have a legitimate 
interest in complying with U.S. discovery rules, as they will otherwise 
face serious sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.164 
Nevertheless, before processing is lawful under Article 7(f), the 
legitimate interest of the data controller must be balanced against 
“the fundamental rights of data subjects.”165 According to the 
Working Party, any determination of lawfulness under Article 7(f) 
must “take into account issues of proportionality, subsidiarity, the 
seriousness of the alleged offences that can be notified and the 
consequences for the data subjects.”166 If the balancing test weighs in 
 
 159. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 202-03, 211 (1958); Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 
F.R.D. 28, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Mr. Radwan's attempt to secure secrecy waivers, if genuine, is 
indeed evidence of good faith."). 
 160. United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 161. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 7(f). 
 162. WP 128, supra note 11, at 18. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (listing possible sanctions as finding disputed factual issues in 
favor of the other party, limiting claims, dismissing the action, rendering a default judgment, and 
contempt of court). 
 165. WP 128, supra note 11, at 18. 
 166. Id. 
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favor of the controller and makes processing lawful under Article 
7(f), the controller must also: give data subjects “the right to object at 
any time on compelling legitimate grounds to the processing of the 
data relating to them,”167 “inform data subjects about the existence, 
purpose and functioning of its data processing, the recipients of the 
personal data and the right of access, rectification and erasure by the 
data subject,”168 and notify the appropriate national data protection 
authorities of their processing activities.169 Despite these substantial 
processing requirements, Article 7(f) seems to be the most reliable 
processing justification in the U.S. discovery context because the 
Working Party has already determined that compliance with U.S. 
court orders can constitute a legitimate interest for the purposes of 
Article 7(f).170 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, it may be possible to use 
specific provisions of the EU Privacy Directive to fully comply with 
EU data protection law while simultaneously complying with a U.S. 
discovery request. To do so, however, a litigant must first justify 
transfer under Article 26(1)(d) and processing under Article 7(f). As 
with the options for persuading U.S. courts to accept restricted 
discovery, this strategy is unpredictable, necessitating a detailed, 
comprehensive strategy for full compliance with both EU and U.S. 
laws. 
III. CONSTRUCTING A STRATEGY FOR FULL 
COMPLIANCE 
Although the conflict between U.S. discovery rules and the 
Privacy Directive initially appears irreconcilable, deeper analysis 
reveals several options for simultaneous compliance with both sets of 
rules. Given that each compliance option possesses strengths and 
weaknesses, recommendations to parties in U.S.-EU trans-border 
litigation for constructing a strong, three-tiered compliance strategy 
are set forth below. Three tiers of compliance strategy are necessary 
 
 167. Id. This fulfills the requirements imposed by Privacy Directive Article 14. See Privacy 
Directive, supra note 7, art. 14. 
 168. WP 128, supra note 11, at 19. This fulfills the requirements of Articles 10 and 11. See 
Privacy Directive, supra note 7, arts. 10-11. 
 169. WP 128, supra note 11, at 19. This fulfills the requirements of Articles 18-20. See 
Privacy Directive, supra note 7, arts. 18-20. 
 170. WP 128, supra note 11, at 18 ("It cannot be denied that SWIFT has a legitimate interest 
in complying with the subpoenas under U.S. law."). 
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because no single strategy has been used successfully with enough 
frequency to enable confidence in it alone. As a result, the strongest 
strategy for full compliance involves a plan in which the top tier is the 
best possible outcome and the third tier is an acceptable outcome.  
The strategies were placed in tier one, two, or three, depending on 
their history of success, projected cost, and projected time 
consumption. 
Tier 1: Seek a Protective Order from the U.S. Court 
Litigants facing U.S. discovery requests for which compliance 
requires violating the Privacy Directive should first seek a protective 
order from the U.S. court excusing noncompliance. This strategy has 
been successfully used by litigants facing a U.S. discovery-Privacy 
Directive conflict.171 To succeed on a motion for a protective order, it 
is helpful if the litigant: 
1. is resisting production of documents which would otherwise  
help their case or are at least neutral;172 
2. demonstrates that the requested information originated in the 
foreign country and remains there;173 
3. is supported in its motion by a statement from the foreign 
sovereign that compliance with the discovery request is on its 
face a violation of the Privacy Directive and its implementing 
legislation and undermines sovereign interests;174 and 
4. shows evidence of good-faith attempts to comply with the 
discovery request before seeking the protective order (such as 
seeking consent from the data subjects, providing alternative 
forms of the information that satisfies the request, etc.).175 
Tier 2: Rely on Privacy Directive Articles 26(1)(d) and 7(f) to justify 
full compliance with the U.S. discovery request. 
If the protective order is denied, the litigant’s second-tier 
strategy should be to use the exceptions to the Privacy Directive to 
 
 171. See Salerno v. Lecia, Inc., No. 97-CV-973S(H), 1999 WL 299306, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 
23, 1999); Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1995). 
 172. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212-13 (1958).  See also United States v. 
Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding this factor against a party resisting 
production of documents that will likely hurt his case). 
 173. Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 902. 
 174. See id. at 902-03; Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 175. Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 903l; Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 40; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 
494, 498 (D.C. 1987). 
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fully comply with the U.S. discovery request. In particular the litigant 
should: 
1. rely on Article 26(1)(d) to transfer personal data for the 
purpose of establishing, exercising, or defending a legal claim; 
and 
2. rely on Privacy Directive Article 7(f) to lawfully process the 
transferred data to achieve the legitimate interests of the data 
controller in complying with a U.S. discovery request and 
avoiding U.S. sanctions for noncompliance. 
Before proceeding with the transfer and processing in reliance on 
these Privacy Directive provisions, the litigant should detail a 
proposed method of transfer and processing and request approval 
from the relevant EU member state data protection authority. To 
obtain permission to proceed under Privacy Directive Articles 
26(d)(1) and 7(f), the litigant should demonstrate to the data 
protection authority that: 
1. reliance on Article 26(1)(d) is necessary for the purposes of 
the litigation because the U.S. court has already denied the 
protective order and failure to comply with the discovery 
request will result in severe sanctions; 
2. the EU member state’s obligations under the Hague Evidence 
Convention are satisfied by the proposed transfer and 
processing;176 
3. compliance with a U.S. discovery order is analogous to 
compliance with a U.S. subpoena and is a legitimate interest 
under Article 7(f); 
4. the interests of the data subjects are being protected to the 
highest possible extent so that their rights are not violated by 
the processing of the data in litigation; 
5.  the consequences for the data subjects are minimal, if any; and 
6.  Privacy Directive Articles 6 and 8 will be respected.177 
 
 176. An example of this would be that the request is pursuant to litigation that has already 
been filed so that Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention is not triggered. 
 177. Article 6 requires that personal data be 
(a) processed fairly and lawfully; 
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed 
in a way incompatible with those purposes. . . . ; 
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected. . .; 
(d) accurate, and . . . ; 
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 Although the Working Party has indicated tentative approval 
of reliance on Article 7 for such purposes, it has not yet commented 
on the specific issue of the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive 
conflict. As such, while this scheme theoretically satisfies the transfer 
and processing rules set down by the Working Party, it is uncertain 
whether the application of the rules in this context would be upheld.  
As a result, this compliance strategy is less favorable than Tier 1 and 
should be a litigant’s second choice. 
Tier 3: Petition the U.S. court for substitution of the Hague Evidence 
Convention for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
If the relevant EU member state data protection authority 
declines to approve the proposed transfer and processing under 
Privacy Directive Articles 26(1)(d) and 7, the litigant’s final attempt 
to comply with both U.S. discovery rules and the Privacy Directive 
should be to petition the U.S. court to substitute the Hague Evidence 
Convention procedures for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
With regard to this petition, the litigant should: 
1.  demonstrate the overly-broad nature of the discovery  
requested of it; 
2. use the denial of its transfer and processing proposal under 
Tier 2 by the EU Member State data protection authority to 
demonstrate the foreign country’s aversion to the discovery 
mechanisms used in this particular case; and 
3. allege that no fact specific reason exists for the Hague 
Evidence Convention procedures to not be effective. 
Once the U.S. court authorizes the use of the Hague Evidence 
Convention, the litigant must then go before the EU judicial 
authority executing the letter of request and either argue that only 
 
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are 
further processed. 
Privacy Directive supra note 7, art. 6. 
  Article 8 prohibits the processing of several “special catagories of data,” namely, "data 
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and . . . data concerning health or sex life." Id. art. 8. Privacy Directive Article 8, 
however, does provide three exceptions to its prohibition of processing sensitive data that would 
allow such processing during a lawsuit: (1) the data subject has given his specific consent, (2) 
“processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific rights of 
the controller in the field of employment law in so far as it is authorized by national law 
providing for adequate safeguards,” and (3) “the processing relates to data which are manifestly 
made public by the data subject or is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defense of 
legal claims.” Id. arts. 8(2)(a), 8(2)(b), 8(2)(e). 
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non-personal data should be provided via the letter of request 
because of the Privacy Directive (recommended if the discoverable 
material will likely hinder the litigant’s case)178 or the personal data 
requested should be provided via the letter of request despite the 
Privacy Directive (recommended if the discoverable material will 
likely help the litigant’s case).179 When making the decision as to 
which argument to advance before the EU executing authority, the 
litigant should keep in mind that if a U.S. court remains unsatisfied 
with the level of discovery achieved under the Hague Evidence 
Convention procedures, the court retains the right to order 
production under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.180 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive conflict 
remains difficult to navigate. Because the conflict is set within the 
larger context of the civil versus common legal system approach to 
evidence gathering, EU member states’ data protection authorities 
have increasingly called for the Working Party to comment on the 
issue directly. Until the Working Party issues such comments, the 
three-tiered compliance strategy offers the best opportunity for a 
litigant facing the U.S. discovery-Privacy Directive conflict to comply 
with both sets of rules. The most favorable outcome for the litigant is 
to succeed in the first-tier strategy; however the second- and third-tier 
strategies are more favorable than risking sanctions either under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Privacy Directive. 
 
 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45. 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48. 
 180. In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 356 (D. Conn. 1991). 
